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Refunding of a climate tax on food consumption in Sweden 
 
Abstract: Refunding of climate taxes on consumption of food might reduce the resistance towards 
the introduction of such a tax, which is necessary to achieve climate targets. This paper examines 
the implication of refunding a tax on consumption of food in Sweden under three refunding 
schemes; lump sum, in proportion to agricultural area, and payments for ecosystem services on 
agricultural land (carbon sink enhancement by restoration of drained peatland, biodiversity 
provision from increased area of grassland, and nutrient regulation by construction of wetlands). 
The theoretical results showed that economic and environmental conditions can improve compared 
with the no tax case under all three schemes, but to different farmer categories. The empirical 
results from a partial agricultural sector model showed that the introduction of a climate tax 
corresponding to the Swedish tax of 115 Euro per ton CO2e reduces total emissions by 5% without 
any refunding of the total tax incomes which amount to 1.391 billion Euro. Refunding with 
payments for restoration of drained peatlands enhance carbon sink by 5.9 million metric tons of 
CO2e and results in net benefit of the tax system as a whole but not for all farmer categories. 
 
Key words; climate tax, food consumption, tax refunding, partial equilibrium analysis, Sweden 
JEL codes; Q28, Q25, H23 
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1. Introduction 
 
Emissions of GHG from agriculture accounts for 22% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions 
worldwide and 80% of these emissions come from livestock (McMichael, 2007). Suggestions have 
therefore been made to introduce climate taxes on meat in order to reduce demand and emissions 
(e.g. UNEP, 2009; Roos and Tjarnemo, 2011; Cederberg et al., 2013; Bajzˇelj et al., 2014; Säll and 
Gren, 2015). Several studies show that the price elasticity of demand for meat and dairy products 
is relatively low (Wirsenius et al., 2011; Edjabou and Smed, 2013; Säll and Gren, 2015, Chalmers 
et al., 2016), which requires considerable increases in the price of meat for a significant reduction 
in emissions.  The introduction of such an environmental tax on consumption of food may also 
meet resistance from the agricultural sector because of expected loss in profits. The fear of profit 
losses and resistance towards the environmental tax can be mitigated by earmarking the revenues 
from the taxes to support farmers (e.g. Kallbekken et al., 2011; Sterner and Coria, 2012). Such 
systems have been introduced in several countries (e.g. Sweden, Demark, Italy, UK, France, the 
Netherlands) where emissions of CO2 and other pollutants have been taxed and refunded by cutting 
other taxes (labor, capital, VAT) or pay roll charges, promote investment in clean technologies, or 
compensate polluters paying the environmental tax (Millock, 2004; Sterner and Isaksson, 2006;  
Aidt, 2010 ).   
 
Starting in early 1990s there is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature on refunding of 
environmental taxes (see review in Freire-Gonzáles 2018). A meta-analysis of the empirical studies 
has pointed out the existence of a double dividend, i.e. improved economic and environmental 
conditions compared to the no policy case (Freire-Gonzáles, 2018). Other studies have examined 
the distributional aspects of a green tax reform, and found that the progressivity in the system 
depends on refunding mechanism (Klenert and Mattauch, 2016). The literature on earmarked 
refunding to specific groups in society, mainly to polluters paying the tax, is smaller (e.g.Aidt, 
2010;  Fischer, 2010; Bonilla et al., 2015; Hagem et al., 2015). Aidt (2010) makes a theoretical 
comparison of three different refunding schemes, income tax cuts, increased governmental 
spending (lump sum), and tax cuts for polluters, and shows that polluters can promote extra 
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governmental spending in order to foster public support for a refunding scheme. Fisher (2010) finds 
that an output based refunding system, where taxes are refunded according to the market share of 
the firm, may increase total emission when there is market power. Hagem et al. (2015) make a 
theoretical comparison of two refunding schemes; payments in proportion to outputs and to 
abatement expenditures. Bonilla et al. (2015) evaluate the impact on the development of clean 
technologies of the refunding of the Swedish tax on NOx, and found that the refunding boosted 
investment in abatement of NOx.  
 
Despite the experiences in practice from emission tax refund systems and the large literature in 
economics, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no study on the effects of a recycled climate tax 
on consumption of food. The purpose of this study is to evaluate such a system, which is made for 
food consumption in Sweden. The refunding schemes are compared with respect to their effects on 
farmers’ profits in Sweden and environmental performance. To this end, a partial equilibrium 
model of the agricultural sector (CAPRI, Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized Impact 
model) is used to evaluate and compare economic and environmental impacts of three refunding 
schemes; lump sum, in proportion to agricultural area and payments for ecosystem services. In our 
view, in addition to the application to consumption of food, the study makes a contribution by 
including payments for ecosystem services as a refunding scheme.  
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple theoretical 
analysis of the economic and environmental outcomes for a profit maximizing farmer under 
different policy schemes, where no tax and refunding provides the benchmark case. The partial 
equilibrium model and data retrieval are presented in the next section, and results are presented in 
Section 4. The paper ends with a discussion and conclusions. 
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2. A model of climate tax refund systems 
 
We consider the agricultural sector to include i=1,…,n farmers, each of whom produce food, Qi,M, 
and other commercial outputs, Qi,O. Simplifications are made by assuming a linear relation between 
output and land use Ai,M  and Ai,O, where Qi,M,=qi,MAi,M and Qi,O,=qi,OAi,O. The farmer is assumed 
to operate on competitive markets where the outputs are sold at the prices  pM and pO.. Without a 
climate tax , the farmer’s decision problem is to choose the allocation of Ai,M and Ai,O which 
maximize profits given a restriction on the total are of agricultural land, 
i
A which is written as: 
, , , , , , , ,
, ,
( , ) . .
,
i
i M i M i M O i O i O i i M i O i M i O
i M i O
Max p q A p q A C Q Q s t A A A
A A
     
        (1) 
where Ci(Qi,M,Qi,O) is the cost function assumed to be increasing at an increasing rate in its 
arguments. The solution to eq. (1) gives the familiar condition where the marginal profits of land 
in the two uses are equal: 
, ,
, ,
(
i i
M i M i O i O
i M i O
C C
p q p q
Q Q

    
      
    
                                                                (2) 
where i is Lagrange multiplier on the land constraint, or the shadow value of land, which is 
determined by the marginal profits from the two land uses. 
 
Total consumption of food in Sweden includes the outputs produced in Sweden and imports, which 
gives 
, ,M i M IMP M
i
Q Q Q  , where QM is determined by the demand for the food and  the (world 
market) price pM . For analytical convenience but without loss of generality, it is assumed that 
green-house gas (GHG) emissions occur only from QM. 
 
2.1 Climate tax without refunding 
 
A climate unit tax,  t., is levied on total consumption of  food QM . The tax is assumed to reflect the 
cost of carbon generated by a marginal food output (e.g. Gren et al. (2019)). It consists of two parts; 
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marginal social cost of carbon and carbon emissions by the food output. Without any other positive 
or negative externalities, the introduction of this tax will generate an efficient outcome where 
marginal social cost of producing food equals the marginal value. Without any refunding, the profit,  
,i t , is given by: 
, , , , , , ,( ) ( , )i t M i M i M O i O i O i i M i Op t q A p q A C Q Q                                                  (3) 
The  first-order conditions deliver:  
, , ,
,
( ) (
i i
M i M i t O i O
i M O
C C
p t q p q
Q Q

    
       
    
                                                     (4) 
Eq. (4) shows that the introduction of the tax on food reallocates land towards other outputs and 
reduces the shadow value of land, i.e. that ,i t i  .   
 
2.2 Lump sum and area based refunding 
 
Total tax revenues, T,  are given by the unit tax times the total consumption of the output, 
MT tQ
. In the lump sum refunding scheme each farmer receives the same amount of funding 
corresponding to T/n, which gives the profits ,i LS  as: 
, , , , , , ,( ) ( , ) /i LS M i M i M O i O i O i i M i Op t q A p q A C Q Q T n                                   (5) 
The optimal allocation of Ai,M and Ai,O is the same as with the tax, which is a well known result of 
a lump sum payment. 
A refunding scheme corresponding to current income support from CAP implies that each farmer 
receives payment in proportion to the agricultural area, 
i
i
i
T
A
A
 and the associated profits, ,i AB
, are written as: 
, , , , , , ,( ) ( , ) /i AB M i M i M O i O i O i i M i O i i
i
p t q A p q M C Q Q A T A                              (6) 
The first-order conditions are  
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                                       (7) 
The marginal value of land is now increased corresponding to the unit area payments, where
, ,i t i AB
i
i
T
A
  

. When 
iiA A , this is likely to increase the area of land in agriculture and 
associated emissions of GHGs (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1998). 
 
2.3 Payments of ecosystem services 
 
There is a large body of literature on the payments of ecosystem services, which considers a number 
of different payments systems such as cost and performance based schemes (see Engel 2016 for a 
survey), In this study, a performance based system is assumed with unit payments for non-marketed 
ecosystem services, sE, which are constant and correspond to society’s marginal value of the 
service. Another assumption is that the farmer needs to allocate land for production of ecosystem 
services, Ai,E, with the productivity of qi,E.   The payment to each farmer is then
, ,E i E i Es q A  where 
total payments can not exceed the tax revenues, i.e. 
, ,E i E i E
i
s q A T . By this formulation, we 
allow for the possibility that the revenue constraint is not binding which occurs when the unit value 
of QE is lower than the average payment, i.e. when 
, ,
E
i E i E
i
T
s
q A


 . In this case, the combination 
of the tax and subsidy system implies an efficient outcome since the tax corresponds to the marginal 
negative externality and the unit payment to the marginal positive externality. 
The famer’s decision problem is then formulated as: 
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , ,
( ) ( , , )
, ,
i ES M i M i M O i O i O E i E i E i i M i O i E
i M i O i E
Max p t q A p q A s q A C Q Q Q
A A A
     
     (8) 
, , , ,. .
i
i M i O i E E i E E
i
s t A A A A and s q A T     
where 
, , ,( , , )i i M i O i EC Q Q Q is the cost function for provision of all outputs. The first-order 
conditions are 
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 
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              (9) 
 
Given the assumptions of a convex cost function,  the farmer will find it profitable to provide 
ecosystem services for which the profit of a marginal Ai,E is higher than the shadow value of land 
in the benchmark case, i.e. when ,
,
i
E E i E i
i E
C
s s q
Q
 
 
   
 
. This implies that ,i ES i  . The 
constraint on the revenues is binding, 0  , when the marginal value of QE is higher than the 
maximum unit payment  
, ,
E
i E i E
i
T
s
q A


.  
2.4 Comparison of the refunding schemes 
 
Based on the simple theoretical analysis we can make two main conclusions (Table 1). One is 
trivial; profits will always be lower without than with refunding. The other is that positive 
environmental impacts are highest when payments are provided for ecosystem services.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of farmer’s profits and environmental effects under different climate tax and 
refunding schemes  
 No refunding Lump sum Area based Ecosystem 
services (ES) 
Profits ,i t i   , ,i LS i t   
,i LS ior    
, ,i AB i t   
, ,i AB i LSor    
,i AB ior    
, ,i ES i t   
, ,i ES i ABor    
, ,i ES i LSor    
,i ES ior    
Environmenta
l effects 
,i t iGHG GHG  , ,i LS i tGHG GHG  ,iAB i LSGHG GHG  , ,i ES i LSGHG GHG  
and ES increase 
 
Starting with comparing the lump sum refunding scheme with the no policy case, it is found from 
Eq. (1) and eq. (5) that    
 
, , ,/i LS i i M i Mwhen T n tq A                                                                                                 (10) 
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This may occur when imports of the taxed food, Qi,IMP,M , is large and for a farmer with relatively 
low qi,M Ai,M.  
Similarly, when we compare the area based system with the lump sum scheme and no policy system 
we obtain (from eqs. (1), (5), and (6)) that 
, , /i AB i LS i
i
i
T
when A T n
A
  

                                                                                      (11) 
, , ,i AB i i i M i M
i
i
T
when A tq A
A
  

                                                                                  (12) 
Finally a comparison of the ecosystem payment system with the other schemes gives 
, , , ,
,
i
i ES i AB E i E i E i
i E i
i
C T
when s q A A
Q A
 
 
   
  
                                                         (13)   
, , , ,
,
/
i
i ES i LS E i E i E
i E
C
when s q A T n
Q
 
 
   
 
                                                                (14) 
, , , , ,
,
i
i ES i E i E i E i M i M
i E
C
when s q A tq A
Q
 
 
   
 
                                                             (15) 
A farmer who is relatively effective in producing ecosystem services with high qi,E and/or low 
,
i
i E
C
Q


 would favor a system with payments for ecosystem services over the other systems. The 
area based system might be preferred to the ecosystem service system for a farmer with relatively 
large Ai, and the lump system is favored by a farmer with  a small Ai.    
 
With respect to environmental effects, there are opportunities for a double dividend, i.e. improved 
profits and reduced GHG emissions as compared to the no policy case, under all refunding schemes. 
The analysis shows that it can not be excluded that (some) farmers are better off under a 
tax/refunding scheme than without any policy at all, which depends on the tax revenues from total 
consumption. High share of imports allows for refunding of revenues where the taxes are not 
directly affecting the Swedish farmers. 
9 
 
 
However, there is a risk of higher GHG emissions under the area based system when marginal 
value of land increases and results in a larger Ai,M. On the other hand, refunding to support 
ecosystem services reduces GHG emissions when some Ai,M is allocated to produce ecosystem 
services. A ‘triple’ dividend may then be obtained where profits increase, GHG emissions decrease 
and ecosystem services are produced.  
 
3. Description of the partial equilibrium model and data retrieval  
 
The partial equilibrium model CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized Impact model) 
is used to assess the impacts on CO2 emissions and farmers’ profits of a climate tax on food 
products and refunding of tax revenues under the different scenarios analyzed in Section 2. The 
benefit of using a partial equilibrium model is that we get detailed representation of the agricultural 
sector and can take land use effects and  trade into account. The climate tax per food product is 
determined by emission of CO2 equivalents and tax per emission unit. Similarly, the payments for 
different ecosystem services are determined by the quantity of the service, such as carbon 
sequestration per unit of agricultural land, and the value per unit of service. Before presenting our 
calculations of the taxes on different food products and payments for ecosystem services we give 
a brief presentation of the CAPRI model.    
 
3.1 Brief presentation of CAPRI and derivation of the reference case 
 
The partial equilibrium model CAPRI was first developed within an EU funded project1 in 1997-
1999 with the objective to develop a model for analysing impacts of the Common European 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). In particular, the model was designed to study specific policies such as 
the sugar reforms, dairy quota abolition and the direct payments. It has since been further developed 
                                                 
1For more information http://www.ilr.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/caprifp4_e.htm  
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and is now used extensively for forward looking policy impact assessment in European agriculture. 
CAPRI delivers results on prices and quantities, feed and fertilizer use, human consumption and 
demand, trade of agricultural commodities, policy costs, agricultural income and profits as well as 
environmental indicators. Himics et al (2018) and Fellman et al 2017 provide examples of recent 
studies using CAPRI in the area of climate change management.  
 
CAPRI can be described as a system of interlinked models, with two main modules; a detailed 
supply module for European regions and a global market module for trade in agricultural products. 
The supply part consists of 276 regional farm models at the NUTS22 level in EU-27, Norway, 
western Balkans and Turkey. Each representative regional farmer is assumed to maximize farm 
income3, minus a nonlinear cost term that allows the model to be calibrated/estimated based on 
observed behaviour (Jansson and Heckelei, 2011). The regional farmer works at given prices and 
subsidies subject to restrictions on land, policy variables and feed and fertilizer in each region. 
Land is endogenous and the total available agricultural land can thus vary across scenarios. 
Agricultural land can be transformed between grassland and arable land based on a transformation 
cost function that was specified based on simulation experiments with a biophysical land use model 
(see e.g. Renwick et al., 2013). Agricultural land supply can increase up to a maximum that has 
been determined for each region based on biophysical data. In simulations, the total land use is also 
restricted by the requirement to possess “entitlements” for the single farm payments, without which 
the marginal value of land would be lower. The supply model contains 50 crop and animal activities 
in each of the regions, producing 51 agricultural commodities covered by the market model, using 
general inputs, intermediate input and outputs, crop-specific inputs and feed and fertilizer inputs 
(Britz and Witzke, 2014).  
 
The market model is a multi-commodity model representing bilateral world trade among 40 trade 
blocs including the EU. Each trade bloc entails a detailed representation of trade policies and 
instruments such as tariffs, export subsidies and bilateral trade agreements. Commodities from 
                                                 
2 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic 
territory of the European Union. The classification is established by regulation EC 1059/2003 
3 Income is defined as the Gross Value Added (GVA) at producer prices plus premiums 
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different blocs are considered imperfect substitutes in the market (the Armington assumption). 
Each trade bloc consists of one or several countries or country aggregates, with behavioural 
equations for human consumption, processing industries and agricultural supply. All goods 
produced inside the same trade bloc are considered perfect substitutes, i.e. there is one market pool 
per bloc. Differences in quality/preferences are considered constant and simulated by fixed price 
differences between individual countries and the market pool. The EU consists of two blocs called 
“EU-west” and “EU-east”. Sweden is part of the EU-west bloc together with the other 14 countries 
that became EU-members up to 1995 (Figure 1). Equilibrium ensures cleared markets for 
agricultural products and young animals. The supply modules and the market model are interlinked 
and solved iteratively. Prices are fixed from the perspective of the farmer and supplied exogenously 
from the market module (Britz and Witzke, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of one CAPRI trade bloc (EU-west) and connection to country level supply 
and demand (Demand includes human consumption, feed use and processing on the country level 
and n is the numbers of countries in the EU-west trade block and SE exemplifying Sweden) 
 
The standard CAPRI market structure, with one pool market for each trading bloc, which includes 
all imports and demand, implies that we do not model the origin of the human consumption on 
national level. This means that, for instance, all Swedish (SE) beef production is sold to the EU-
west pool, and all Swedish beef consumption is obtained from that pool, regardless of where it was 
originally produced. If beef consumption in Sweden is taxed and reduced, demand decreases in the 
EU-west pool and lower prices for all suppliers to that pool. The price impact is the same for all 
suppliers to the pool.  
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In practice, Swedish beef has a larger market share in Sweden than in other EU countries because 
Swedish consumers, similar to consumers in other countries, tend to prefer the locally produced 
beef to imports. Therefore, the hypothetical tax on consumption may, ceteris paribus, have a larger 
impact on Swedish producers than on producers in other countries because most of the tons that 
are taxed are produced in Sweden. In order to account to this, we computed ad-hoc changes in the 
price mark-ups between the pool price and the producer prices in all countries which generates  
differentiated price impacts on suppliers depending on their market shares in Sweden. To this end, 
we assumed that a change in consumption in Sweden would affect all producers in the EU in 
proportion to their share of the Swedish market. That is, if the share of Swedish beef in the Swedish 
market is 50%, and there is a reduction in demand of 100 tons, then the reduction in demand for 
Swedish beef should be 50 tons whereas all other sources together reduce their supply to Sweden 
by the remaining 50 tons. In order to obtain matching decreases in supply, a price wedge between 
the EU pool and Swedish suppliers was added, computed by multiplying the slope of a linear 
approximation of the supply curve for Swedish suppliers by the expected reduction in volume (and 
similar for non-Swedish suppliers, which becomes insignificantly little). The slope of the linear 
supply curves for various origins were found by performing a simulation experiment with the 
model. 
 
A reference case for Sweden gives us a benchmark for our counterfactual analysis where the impact 
of a climate tax on food products and refunding schemes are measured as deviation from this 
reference case. The reference case is obtained from the CAPRI baseline, which is a projection of 
the European agriculture and food sector to 2030 under a set of macro-economic assumptions and 
current policies. This gives the “business-as-usual” (BAU) development of the Swedish 
agricultural market. Policies in place are the CAP, including the “greening” requirements and 
payments, Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) to farmers, Voluntary Coupled Support (used for bovine 
cattle in Sweden) as well as the Rural Development Program (RDP) within the second pillar of 
CAP, where we model the Swedish agri-environmental schemes and support to areas with natural 
constraints. The model also contains the Nordic Aid to dairy in Northern Sweden. The baseline is 
assumed to be a comparative static equilibrium. 
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Meat, dairy and vegetable food products constitute the tax bases in the calculations (see Table A1 
for a full list of the products included). Products used as inputs are excluded to avoid double 
accounting. The baseline levels of consumption, import shares, consumer prices and own price 
elasticities of these products in the reference case, BAU, are displayed in Error! Reference source 
not found..  
 
Table 2. Projected consumption, import share, consumer prices and own price elasticity of 
demand for food commodities in Sweden in 2030 for BAU. 
 
Product Consumption 
(1000t) 
Import share of 
market used 
Consumer Price 
(Euro/t) 
Own price elasticity 
Soft wheat 489.18 0.04 4830.62 -0.29 
Other cerealsa 193.50 0.89 4588.78 -0.44 
Potatoes 824.22 0.75 1538.66 -0.46 
Other vegetablesb 608.47 0.37 1008.38 -0.48 
Beef 275.15 0.48 11397.93 -0.51 
Pork meat 383.45 0.54 9262.75 -0.50 
Sheep and goat meat 19.07 0.69 12271.41 -0.61 
Poultry meat 242.55 0.46 5014.67 -0.65 
Eggs 137.62 0.19 6020.54 -0.23 
Butter 30.74 0.28 6012.76 -0.15 
Skimmed milk 
powder 
36.00 0.01 4002.39 -0.37 
Cheese 180.49 0.57 7854.34 -0.35 
Fresh milk productsc 1201.61 0.15 1245.12 -0.35 
Cream 159.72 0.22 6109.47 -0.36 
Concentrated milk 6.36 0.60 3803.47 -0.53 
Whole milk powder 48.38 0.04 5460.69 -0.37 
Rape seed oil 40.70 0.64 5782.13 -1.60 
Sugar 298.32 0.59 16963.85 -0.15 
Total 5176.53    
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a Includes triticale but not soft wheat, durum wheat, rye and meslin, barley, oats or grain maize; bIncludes all vegetables 
excluding tomatoes. cFresh milk products include drinking milk and yoghurt but not cream. dMarket use includes feed 
use, human consumption, industrial input, seed, processing and losses. 
 
Recall from Section 2 that a relatively large import share can generate net increases in profits for 
Swedish farmers. The import shares presented in Table 2 show the share of total imports which 
includes human consumption and inputs into production. For most products, the largest share is 
used for human consumption, but, for example, the largest part of Other cereals is used for animal 
feed.  Similar to several studies estimating price elasticities of food (e.g. Säll and Gren, 2015), the 
own-price elasticities in CAPRI, based on USDA (2003), are low for all included products. 
Relatively low price elasticities imply high tax revenues because of the small decrease in demand.  
 
Regarding Swedish farmers’ net incomes and land use in the reference case, calculations are made 
for farmers in different NUTS2 regions. Total profits, number of holders and areas of land differ 
in these regions which implies that the profit per representative farmer differ (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Number of registered farms, area of pasture and arable land, and net incomes from 
agricultural production in different Swedish NUTS2 regions. 
Region Number of 
holdersa 
Pastureb. 
1000 ha 
Arablec 
land. 1000 
ha 
Agr. land. 
ha/farm 
Net income, 
1000 Euro 
Net income. 
Euro/farm 
Stockholm 1939 24 97 62 29401 15164 
Östra mellansverige 12027 67 635 58 241711 20196 
Sydsverige 9512 32 581 64 280490 29709 
Norra 
mellansverige 
7120 48 168 30 113510 15957 
Mellersta Norrland 3400 57 62 35 56645 16765 
Övre Norrland 3568 33 67 28 77646 21805 
Småland med 
öarna 
9955 97 278 38 325106 32885 
Västsverige 15356 65 627 45 255023 16629 
Sweden total 62877 423 2515 47 1379531 22043 
aSwedish Board of Agriculture (2016); bExtensive and intensive grazing from the reference 
scenario in CAPRI. cFrom CAPRI reference scenario 
15 
 
 
The total profit amounts to approximately 1.4 billion Euro. The highest average profits are obtained 
by farmers in the south of Sweden and the lowest in the northern regions.  
 
3.2 Calculations of GHG emissions and tax on food products 
 
GHG emissions and tax per tonne food product are calculated based  on emission coefficients for 
each product and the consumption quantities displayed in Table 3. In order to avoid double taxation 
of inputs subject to existing carbon tax we consider only emissions from production of the food 
products which includes emissions of methane and N2O from agricultural processes (e.g. Gren et 
al., 2019). This excludes e.g. CO2 from fossil fuels and other energy use, transportation, land use 
change, and emissions associated with the industrial production of inputs.  GHG emissions are 
converted into carbon dioxide equivalents, using Global warming potential (GWP100)
4. 
 
The CAPRI model includes two types of coefficients for GHG emissions from agriculture: 
“standard” emission coefficients computed on from the supply side and coefficients computed from 
the demand side. The standard coefficients show emissions for products at the place of production, 
whereas the demand side coefficients include emissions associated with the production of tradable 
intermediate inputs. The main difference is that standard coefficients emissions of tradable feeding 
stuffs, such as cereals or protein crops, are derived at the place of origin, whereas the demand side 
computation adds them to the emission of the animals where the products are fed (ultimately adding 
them to the marketable output such as meat) and subtracts them from the region of origin. We use 
the demand side coefficients as basis for calculating the tax since it is levied on consumption.  
These coefficients are used for the Swedish and imported food products, which is a simplification 
since they would differ for different origins of production. However, for Sweden, most of the 
imports come from other EU-countries and coefficients within EU varies to a lesser extent. 
                                                 
4 IPCC 2007: Global warming potentials (based on Fourth AR 2007, Ch2.10.2 "Direct Global Warming Potentials" 
Table 2.14 p.212) Source: IPCC, 2007. Climate change 2007: Synthesis report. Contribution of working groups I, II 
and III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K.and Reisinger, A. (eds.). IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland 
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The calculation of the demand side coefficients in CAPRI is based on the standard supply side 
coefficients, adjusted by taking trade data and input/output relations into account. The standard 
coefficients are computed in different ways inside the EU and in the global trade model. Inside the 
EU, they are computed bottom up from the production activities using the physical mass flows of 
the model in combination with coefficients from the IPCC. For regions outside of the EU, for which 
there exist no detailed agricultural supply model, we estimate the emission coefficients based on 
the public emission inventories of FAOSTAT combined with agricultural production data and 
Bayesian priors. The emission coefficients are presented in Table 4.  
 
With respect to the damage costs per unit GHG emissions, there is a large body of literature 
calculating so-called social cost of carbon (see Tol  2018 for a review). In principle, there are four 
different approaches. One is to calculate the shadow cost of reaching GHG targets in a cost-
effectiveness framework (see Tol 2013 for a review), another is to calculate damages in monetary 
terms from a marginal change in GHG emissions (e.g. Tol, 2005; Marten et al., 2015), the third is 
to calculate optimal marginal damage when considering costs of mitigation measures (e.g. 
Nordhaus, 2007; Hassler et al., 2016). The fourth approach, which is used in this study, is to 
perceive existing carbon taxes as a revealed preference of the marginal damage. Another argument 
for using the existing carbon tax in Sweden is that all sources of GHG should meet the same tax 
for cost-effective GHG emission reductions. The Swedish tax amounts to approximately 115 
Euro/tonne CO2-e in 2016 current prices (e.g. Martinsson and Fridahl, 2018). The introduction of 
this tax implies price increases of the included meat and dairy products which vary between 0.11% 
and 17.40% (Table 4).  
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Table 4: GHG emission coefficient for consumption, total emissions from consumption in the 
reference case and climate tax per tonne food consumption and the percentage change in price from 
the tax in 2030. Prices in 2030.  
 
 
Consumption of beef accounts for 45% of total emissions, and the high emission coefficients 
generate relatively large increase in the consumer price from the introduction of the tax. Fresh milk 
and cheese correspond to approximately ¼ of total emissions, but the respective relative price 
increases are lower than those on beef.  
 
Product 
Kg CO2e emission/ 
Kg consumption 
Tonnes of CO2e 
emission from 
consumption 
Climate tax 
Euro/t 
consumption 
% increase in 
price  
Soft wheat 0.09 44.30 12.81 0.26 
Other cereals 0.11 20.36 14.88 0.32 
Potatoes 0.02 14.84 2.55 0.17 
Other vegetables 0.02 12.34 2.87 0.28 
Beef 16.96 4665.30 2398.42 17.40 
Pork meat 2.54 973.75 359.21 3.73 
Sheep and goat meat 17.97 342.77 2542.55 17.17 
Poultry meat 1.28 311.01 181.38 3.49 
Eggs 0.84 115.33 118.54 1.93 
Butter 4.73 145.27 668.46 10.00 
Skimmed milk powder 3.79 136.26 535.41 11.83 
Cheese 5.85 1056.39 827.91 9.53 
Fresh milk products 1.10 1322.23 155.65 11.12 
Cream 4.75 758.22 671.51 9.92 
Concentrated milk 2.97 18.87 419.78 9.94 
Whole milk powder 5.04 243.67 712.45 11.57 
Rape seed oil 0.42 16.94 58.89 1.01 
Sugar 0.13 39.94 18.94 0.11 
Total  10237.80   
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3.3. Payments for ecosystem services: biodiversity, carbon sequestration, and nutrient 
regulation 
 
In principle, the payment per unit ecosystem service should correspond to the marginal value of 
the service, such as the value of a marginal unit of biodiversity. The choice of ecosystem services 
to be funded in this study is guided by possibilities and limitation set by CAPRI and available data 
necessary for calculating the unit payment. Ideally, there are quantified functional relations 
between land use of provision of an ecosystem service, and data on the value per unit of the 
ecosystem services. The farmers would then be paid for the quantity of provided services and 
choose the optimal land use management as shown in Section 2. Such a system corresponds to 
payments of marketed outputs such as wheat and potatoes. However, necessary scientific 
knowledge and data are not available, and we therefore attach unit values and quantities to area of 
land use for all included services; biodiversity by natural grassland, carbon sequestration from 
restoration of drained peat land, and nutrient regulation from construction of wetlands.  
 
Starting with payments for biodiversity provision by natural grass land, there is a large body of 
literature on the estimation of the value of biodiversity (see Atkinson et al., 2012 for a review) 
provided by different ecosystems in different parts of the world. Most studies estimate the value 
by stated preferences in hypothetical markets where they provide a willingness to pay or 
willingness to accept a certain change in the provision of biodiversity. In principle, we could 
transfer estimated measure of value per ha from these studies, but there is no study on the 
biodiversity value of grassland in the boreal zones. Similar to the choice of social cost of carbon, 
we therefore apply the revealed preference approach where the relation in actual payments for 
biodiversity on grassland among the NUTS2 regions reflect the authorities’ perceived relative 
values.  However, actual payments are limited by budget constraints, and it is here simply assumed 
that the actual valuation is twice as high as the actual payments. As shown in Table 4, these 
payments vary between Euro169/ha (Sydsverige) and 521/ha (Övre Norrland).  
 
Regarding the value of carbon sequestration of restoring drained peatland on agricultural land, 
there is no information on carbon releases from drained peatlands in different NUTS2 regions. 
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Instead there are measurements of average leaching from grassland and arable land on drained 
peatland in Sweden (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2014). The reported leaching per unit of arable 
land is 30.3 tonnes CO2e/ha and that of grassland is 11.4 tonnes CO2e/ha. The restoration of the 
peat lands would not eliminate all leaching because of the methane release, which amounts to 4.4 
and 0.3 tonnes CO2e/ha on arable land and grassland, respectively (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 
2014). The value per unit leaching reduction is assumed to correspond to the actual tax of Euro 
115/ tonne CO2e, which gives a payment of 2978 Euro/ha and 1277 Euro/ha for peat land restoration 
on arable land and grassland, respectively. These payments would cover the private economics 
costs of rewetting agriculture on drained peat lands, which range between 41 Euro/ton CO2e and 
46 Euro/CO2e (Markensten et al., 2018, Table 3)  
 
Finally, the payments for constructing wetlands to regulate nutrient loads are calculated as the 
quantity of nutrient retention in the wetlands times the unit value of each nutrient. It is assumed 
that the wetlands are located downstream close to the coastal zones, and the abatement by wetlands 
is then dependent on the upstream nutrient load from agriculture and sources discharging nutrient 
into the coastal waters. These loads are, in turn, determined by different types of production 
technologies and policies. The nutrient load entering the wetlands depends on the transformation 
of the nutrients during the transport from the sources to the wetland, the so-called nutrient retention. 
Both loads from emission sources and nutrient retention vary among the regions, and there is only 
one study calculating nutrient abatement by wetland, which accounts for management practices at 
emission sources and nutrient retention (Gren et al., 2015), which is used in this study (Table A2).  
 
The unit value of nutrient abatement is obtained from Gren et al. (2018) and is calculated as the 
shadow cost of reaching the nutrient emissions targets set by the Baltic Sea Action Plan by Helcom 
(2013), which correspond to 13% and 42% reduction in the total loads of nitrogen and phosphorus, 
respectively. The shadow costs in a cost effective solution amount to 4 Euro/kg N and 362 Euro/kg 
P and show the increases in minimum costs of reducing the emission target by 1 kg of the respective 
nutrient.  Using these values and the wetland abatement reported in Table A2, the value of nutrient 
regulation per ha wetland construction varies between 414 Euro/ha and 2879 Euro/ha (Table 4). 
These values of wetlands for nutrient regulations are partly revealed by actual support to cover the 
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costs of wetland construction for biodiversity provision and pollutant regulation of waters (e.g. 
Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2018). The payments amount to maximum 22000 Euro/ha for 
investment and to 440 Euro/ha and year for management costs (e.g. Swedish Board of Agriculture, 
2018), which at a discount rate of 5% corresponds to approximately 1540 Euro/ha and year. The 
additional payments suggested here could thus rise the current support considerably.  
 
Table 5: Payments for different ecosystem services, Euro/ha and year in 2016 prices 
Region Biodiversity on 
grasslanda 
Restored drained peatlandb; 
Arable                  Grassland 
Wetland for nutrient 
regulationc 
Stockholm 184 2978 1277 1670 
Östra mellansverige  221 2978 1277 1670 
Sydsverige 169 2978 1277 2879 
Norra mellansverige 255 2978 1277 414 
Mellersta Norrland 353 2978 1277 414 
Övre Norrland 521 2978 1277 266 
Småland med öarna 197 2978 1277 1670 
Västsverige 196 2978 1277 2360 
a Table A2; breduced leaching per ha in Table A2 multiplied by the value of 115 Euro/ton CO2 
reduction; c nutrient regulations N and P per ha in Table A2 multiplied by the values 4 Euro and 
362 Euro per kg nitrogen and phosphorus reduction, respectively. 
 
In the reference scenario, the gross revenue amounts to 3192 Euro/ha in average for Sweden (Table 
A3). The payments for restoration of peatland are then in the same order of magnitude as the gross 
revenues and exceed the gross revenues in three NUTS2 regions; Stockholm, Norra mellansverige, 
and Mellersta Norrland. The payments in real terms are constant over the period until 2030 with 
an assumed inflation rate of 1.9%. 
 
Total payments are limited by the areas of land eligible for payments. For example, payments for 
biodiversity on grassland is limited by the area available for grassland, and payments for restoration 
of peat lands can be made only for agriculture on drained peat lands. Data on areas of drained peat 
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land is obtained from Phakakangas et al. (2016), and it is assumed that the actual grassland area in 
2016 (Statistics Sweden, 2017) constitutes the maximum payment area for biodiversity. With 
respect to wetland for nutrient regulation, they need to be constructed downstream in a catchment 
in order to reduce nutrient loads to the sea. There is no data on the availability of such land, and 
we therefore follow Gren and Säll (2015) and simply assume that 1% of arable land is suitable for 
wetland construction.  
 
Table 6: Maximum areas for payments, 1000 ha 
Region Grassland for 
biodversitya 
Restored drained peat landb ; 
Arable                   Grassland 
Wetland for 
nutrient reg.c 
Stockholm 10.5 10.05 1.89 0.97 
Östra 
mellansverige 
91.60 68.15 10.16 6.35 
Sydsverige 67.10 20.35 9.46 5.81 
Norra 
mellansverige 
24.00 5.78 3.85 1.68 
Mellersta 
Norrland 
14.50 1.43 1.65 0.62 
Övre Norrland 4.70 6.33 2.30 0.67 
Småland med 
öarna 
160.80 37.30 10.87 2.78 
Västsverige 78.80 28.50 7.63 6.27 
Total 452.00 177.98 47.78 25.15 
aStatistics Sweden (2017) Table 3.1; bPahkakangas et al. 2016 Table 4A; c1% of arable  land from 
CAPRI 
 
To evaluate eventual conflicting uses of tax revenues we calculate total revenue requirement under 
assumptions of full payment. It is then assumed that the payments listed in Table 4 for providing 
biodiversity, restoring peat lands and constructing wetlands are made for the maximum areas 
displayed in Table 5. The total payment for biodiversity, carbon sequestration enhancement and 
nutrient regulations would then amount to 94 million Euro, 591 million Euro, and 49 million Euro, 
respectively in 2016 prices. This gives a total amount of 734 million Euro. It can also be noted that 
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restoration of all drained peatlands would increase carbon sinks by 5.9 million tonnes of CO2e 
which corresponds to approximately 60% of the calculated emissions from the agricultural sector. 
 
4. Impacts of the climate tax and refunding schemes 
 
Given the structure of the CAPRI model and all assumptions concerning the determination of the 
climate tax on food products and payments for ecosystem services, we calculate the impacts of 
different refunding systems on farmers’ economic performance and environment, mainly emissions 
of CO2e.  Since the total tax revenues available for refunding are determined by the impacts of the 
tax on the consumption of food, we present these effects. 
 
4.1 Impacts on demand, supply and emissions of food products 
 
The introduction of the climate tax on different food products as reported in Table 4 will decrease 
the demand for the different food items as shown in Table 7.  
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Table 7: Swedish consumption, production, imports and emissions from consumption in 2030 with 
a climate tax. Total values and percentage difference to baseline.  
 
Products 
 
Consumption; 
 
1000t           %∆ 
Production in 
Sweden; 
1000t              %∆ 
Imports; 
 
1000t  %∆ 
GHG emissiona; 
t CO2e    %∆ 
 
Soft wheat 488.77 -0.08 1945.45 -0.04 69.43 0.00 44.27 -0.08 
Other cereals 193.5 0.00 196.82 -0.77 1010.41 -2.82 20.36 0.00 
Potatoes 829.21 0.61 345.79 0.48 851.71 0.48 14.93 0.61 
Other vegetables 611.76 0.54 414.92 0.32 244.61 0.92 12.41 0.54 
Beef 252.99 -8.05 131.02 -19.25 140.34 6.89 4289.57 -8.05 
Pork meat 389.17 1.49 216.34 0.39 211.35 2.37 988.27 1.49 
Sheep and goat meat 17.66 -7.39 5.24 -14.38 12.58 -4.04 317.43 -7.39 
Poultry meat 248.72 2.54 145.75 1.07 115.48 4.19 318.92 2.54 
Eggs 137.7 0.06 150.40 0.19 27.43 0.00 115.40 0.06 
Butter 30.45 -0.94 36.92 1.37 8.84 0.00 143.90 -0.94 
Skimmed milk powder 34.97 -2.86 42.61 15.35 0.47 0.00 132.36 -2.86 
Cheese 176.49 -2.22 78.01 -16.89 114.88 11.56 1032.97 -2.22 
Fresh milk products 1167.6 -2.83 1131.93 1.99 125.85 -30.87 1284.80 -2.83 
Cream 156.13 -2.25 119.89 -3.18 36.19 0.81 741.18 -2.25 
Concentrated milk 6.23 -2.04 2.58 -0.39 3.69 -3.15 18.49 -2.04 
Whole milk powder 47.08 -2.69 54.92 -3.58 1.83 0.00 237.13 -2.69 
Rape seed oil 40.42 -0.69 252.77 0.01 398.70 -0.17 16.83 -0.69 
Sugar 298.92 0.20 386.76 -0.03 184.42 0.00 40.02 0.20 
         
Total 5127.77 -0.92 5658.12 -0.39 3558.21 -1.38 9769.23 -4.58 
a Percent change per product the same as for percent change in consumption 
 
Recall from section 3.1 that demand includes human consumption, feed and processing, which is 
why imports of other cereals is negative although there is no change in consumption. Other cereals 
and soft wheat are used for animal feed and when the tax is implemented, there is a reduction in 
the number of animals which reduces the demand for feed. Sweden is a net importer of other 
cereals, which is why the import decrease as demand for feed decreases. For soft wheat, the case 
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is reversed and there is an increase in export. The largest decrease in production comes from beef 
and sheep and goat meat, which are also the products with the largest decrease in emissions from 
consumption. Production of cheese in Sweden also decreases, but consumption only decreases by 
2 percent, while imports increase. Therefore, there is only a small decrease in emissions from 
consumption. Because of the substitution effects among the food products, consumption of e.g. 
pork and poultry increase since they are substitutes for beef.  
 
When assessing impacts on home produced and imported food products, it is assumed that the 
market shares are unchanged compared with the baseline. This explains the relatively higher impact 
on production of some food products in Sweden compared with imports. This will, in turn, affect 
the net incomes for farmers with animals. 
 
In total, CO2e emissions from the included food products are reduced by approximately 5%. The 
main part, 80%, of this reduction is attributed to the reduction in consumption of beef. These effects 
are smaller compared with Säll and Gren (2015) who found that a tax on consumption of meat and 
dairy products corresponding to the Swedish carbon dioxide tax reduces CO2e emissions from 
agriculture by 12%. Their study uses higher emission coefficients, which can explain the 
difference.  
 
4.2 Effects of different refunding schemes 
 
Total tax revenues amount to 1391 million Euro5, which is in the same order of magnitude as the 
net income of all farmers in the reference case. However, it is quite likely that the transfer as such 
will incur transaction costs and it is therefore simply assumed that 80% of 1391 million Euro, is 
transferred. In the following, we calculate impacts on farmers’ net incomes in different regions and 
environmental effects for seven different scenarios, which are defined in Table 8.  All calculations 
are made for simulations until year 2030 and are compared with the reference case for Sweden. 
                                                 
5 In 2030 current prices 
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Table 8. Definition of different refunding schemes of a climate tax on consumption 
Scenario Scenario description 
No refunding  
Lump sum Tax revenues are refunded with equal amount per 
holder 
BPS  The tax revenue is refunded as area based 
payments (BPS) 
Biodiversity The tax revenue is refunded as farmer support for 
ES measures to preserve biodiversity 
Restored peatland The tax revenue is refunded as farmer support for 
ES measures to capture GHG emissions 
Wetland Payments for nutrient regulation of coastal 
wetlands 
Ecosystems Payments to all three ecosystem services 
 
The total number of farmers amounts to 62877 (Table 3), which gives a transfer of 17.52 thousand 
Euro per farmer under the lump sum scheme. Total agricultural area is 2938 thousand ha (Table 3) 
which gives a refunding of 379 Euro/ha for an unchanged total agricultural area.  The effects on 
baseline net income (Table 3) from the introduction of the tax without any refunding and with the 
lump sum and area based are presented in Table 9.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Percent change in baseline profits under different refunding schemes  
Region No refunding Lump sum Area based  Peatland Wetland Biodiv Ecosystems 
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Stockholm -12.39 115.12 152.60 131.12 -2.99 -2.68 150.00 
Östra 
mellansverige 
-18.34 85.02 89.56 98.03 -14.01 -8.01 112.36 
Sydsverige -11.91 57.67 68.27 21.86 -3.54 -3.63 37.72 
Norra 
mellansverige 
-19.36 93.06 57.83 6.34 -17.62 -13.43 13.51 
Mellersta 
Norrland 
-20.04 84.46 71.28 -5.61 -18.88 -13.45 2.70 
Övre Norrland -18.56 66.47 35.21 18.03 -17.55 -16.98 20.62 
Småland med 
Öarna 
-27.01 47.66 15.91 23.09 -25.54 -12.71 38.30 
Västsverige -27.68 101.30 69.87 20.82 -19.04 -19.07 37.69 
Sweden total -20.84 73.84 59.16 35.01 -15.99 -11.33 48.93 
Payments in % 
of total tax 
revenue 
 80 82 55 5 9 69 
 
Without any refunding, total net income is reduced with 288 million Euro, or 20.84 per cent. 
However, the allocation is uneven where the reductions in percent are high in regions with 
relatively much beef production.  Approximately half of the total loss occurs in two regions, 
Småland and Öarna and Västsverige. However, the income per holder is highest in Småland and 
Öarna, while it is relatively low in Västsverige (see Table 3).  
 
Refunding of approximately 80 percent of the tax revenues would more than compensate the 
farmers, which is shown by the considerable increases in net incomes under the lump sum and area 
based system. As expected, the increase in net income under a lump sum system is relatively high 
in regions with low average income per farm (Stockholm, Västsverige). The area based system 
raises income relatively much in Stockholm and Östra Mellansverige. 
 
Total decrease in income is also more than compensated under a system with payments for restoring 
drained peat lands, but not for farmers in all regions. Regions with abundance of drained peatlands 
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face net gains (e.g. Stockholm and Östra Mellansverige) while a northern region (Mellersta 
Norrland) faces net losses. Unlike peatlands, all regions make net losses with payments for either 
wetlands or grassland which are low and correspond to 5% and 9% of total revenues, respectively. 
On the other hand, income in all regions increase when payments are made for all included 
ecosystem services.´ 
 
With respect to environmental effects, the decrease in consumption generates a decrease in CO2e 
emissions by 5%. However, as a result of the refunding, farmers change production and land use, 
which are examined in this section. Environmental effects from production in Sweden are much 
determined by the changes in land use compared with the reference case, which are displayed for 
all refunding schemes but the lump sum payments in Figure 2 . Percentage change in Utilized 
Agricultural Area under different refunding schemes 
 
 
Figure 2 . Percentage change in Utilized Agricultural Area under different refunding schemes 
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Without any refunding, there is a small decrease in Utilized Agriculutral Area (UAA )in all regions, 
which corresponds to a total reduction of 0.32%. The largest impacts occur under the area based 
system, where the UAA increases by 9.87% in the entire Sweden, but by 21% in the Stockholm 
region. The impact on emissions of CO2e is determined by changes in production and allocation of 
change between grassland and arable land (Figure 3). The composition of arable and grassland 
changes in the BPS, Wetland and Ecosystems scenarios where there are shifts from arable land to 
grassland. In the biodiversity scenario, grassland increases by 5 % in total and most in Sydsverige 
with 30 % increase in grassland.   
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Changes in grass and arable land under different refunding schemes 
 
Both pasture and arable land increase under the area based system, and, as expected, grassland 
increases under the Biodiversity and Ecosystem scenarios. Despite the increase of both land uses 
under the area based system, total emission of CO2e decreases because of the decline in cattle 
holdings but the decrease is smaller than for the other refunding schemes (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4 Changes in production based  CO2e emissions in Sweden under different tax refunding 
schemes.  
 
In addition to the decrease in CO2e emissions from production, targeted environmental effects are 
obtained. The reduction in arable land when funding restoration of peatlands implies a carbon sink 
enhancement which amounts to 5.9 millions metric tons of CO2e. This corresponds to 60% of the 
calculated emissions from the included food products and to 9.4% of total CO2e emissions in 
Sweden in 2016 and 2017 (Statistics Sweden, 2019). This carbon sink enhancement is in the same 
order of magnitude under the Ecosystem scenario since all drained peatlands are restored also in 
this case.  
 
The nitrogen and phosphorus reductions obtained by conversion of arable land into wetlands 
amount to 5.9 kton N and 0.07 kton P, which correspond to 4.5% and 1.9% of N and P emissions 
from Sweden into the Baltic Sea, respectively (Gren et al., 2018). When we compare the country 
targets on reduction requirements set by the Helcom (2013), wetland construction accounts for 
64% and 13% of the reduction requirement of N and P, respectively (Gren et al., 2018). The nutrient 
surplus at the farm level is also affected where nitrogen surplus decreases by 2% without any 
refunding but can increase with the same percentage under the area based system. 
 
Improved biodiversity from increased area of grassland is obtained under three refunding systems, 
BPS, Biodiversity, and Ecosystems, but to different degrees.  The funding of grassland results in 
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an increase in this area by 5.17%, which is limited by the maximum area available as displayed in 
Table 6. The increase is reduced by one half under the Ecosystem scheme, and is lowest under the 
BPS system where it amounts to 1%. However, the increase in grassland area under all systems 
mitigates the decline by 20% since 2004 (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2019).   
 
5. Summary and conclusions  
 
The main purpose of this study has been to assess impacts on farmers’ net incomes and environment 
of a climate tax on consumption of food in Sweden under different schemes for refunding the tax 
revenues. To this end, an agricultural sector model of the EU was used to assess the implications 
of the tax on demand and production of the food products. The climate tax was determined by the 
Swedish CO2 tax, which amounts to Euro 0.115/kg CO2 emission, and the content of CO2e in the 
food products. The highest tax as measured by increases in the consumer price prior to the tax was 
obtained for beef, for which the price increased by 17%. Seven different refunding schemes were 
evaluated; no refunding, lump sum per farmer, area based, restoration of drained peat lands for 
carbon sink enhancement, construction of wetlands for nutrient abatement, increase in grassland 
for biodiversity improvement, payments for all three ecosystem services. We compared results with 
a baseline scenario without and tax policy for agricultural production and trade in 2030. Payments 
for the different ecosystem services were derived from revealed preferences based on actual 
decisions on the carbon tax, nutrient and biodiversity targets. The calculations indicated annual 
payments for the ecosystem services up to 2978 Euro/ha, which is in the same order of magnitude 
as the average gross revenue from agricultural land in Sweden. 
 
The imposition of the designed climate tax resulted in a net decrease in emissions from 
consumption by approximately 5%. The farmers’ income decreased by 288 million Euro, or 
20.84% of the reference income, but ranged between the NUTS2 regions from 12% to 28%. The 
total tax revenues amounted to 1377 million Euro, and a refunding of 80% resulted in net increases 
in incomes in all regions under the lump sum, area based systems, and payments for all ecosystem 
services. The payments for peatland raised total income, but not for all regions because of the 
31 
 
uneven allocations to regions with relatively large areas of drained peatlands. Payments for 
wetlands and grassland resulted in net losses for all regions because of the relatively low payments.  
 
With respect to environmental performance, the tax on consumption reduced emissions of CO2e 
from consumption by 5% in the scenario without any refunding, which is the same in all scenarios 
under the assumption of unchanged emission coefficient. It is likely however, that emission 
coefficients change as production and inputs change, which in turn would change the calculated 
effect on total emission. Emissions of CO2e from production decreased under all refunding 
schemes, but to different degrees where it ranged between approximately 4% (area based system) 
and 8% (peatland restoration and payments for all ecosystem services). However, the payments for 
restoration of peatlands increased carbon sink enhancement corresponding to 9.4% of total 
emissions in Sweden. A main conclusion from this study is thus that the effect of the climate tax 
on emissions of CO2e from consumption is relatively low, but the funding for restoration of 
peatlands would show a considerable decrease in emissions. With respect to other environmental 
effects, payment for construction of wetlands would also be important where the abatement 
accounts for 60% and 13% of the international commitment of reductions in loads of nitrogen and 
phosphorus, respectively, to the Baltic Sea. Payments for grassland raised this area by at the most 
5%.  
 
The results rest on a number of different assumptions related to the availability of data and 
construction of the CAPRI model. Costs of land use change in addition to opportunity cost of land 
are not included, which is likely to overestimate the incomes from all systems with payments for 
ecosystem services. Availability of data limits the choice of possible refunding objects. 
Alternatives to the included schemes are subsidies of food which are regarded as environmentally 
friendly or food promoting public health, which would partly compensate for consumers’ welfare 
losses from the tax. As demonstrated by Säll (2018), the welfare loss of an environmental tax on 
meat, calculated as compensating variation, can correspond to 1% of the average household 
income. The introduction of such schemes would require information on the unit subsidies for the 
food products based on the quantified and monetarized effect of the products, which do not exist.  
It can also be argued that the best alternative for society would be to use the revenues to decrease 
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taxes on other tax bases, in particular, income from labor. The marginal cost of the tax system in 
terms of dead weight losses differ among tax bases, but can be approximately 40% of a marginal 
cut in the savings income tax (Sörensen, 2010).  
 
The static approach of the CAPRI model excludes the possibilities of investment in new 
technologies. This might be of particular importance under the lump sum and area based payment 
schemes where farmers in all regions make net gains which can be used for investment. Another 
aspect is that an effective CO2e tax on consumption reduces the tax base when consumption of 
carbon intensive food products decrease, which reduces future tax revenues and refunding. Other 
aspects not considered in the assessment is that there might be institutional and legal restrictions 
on the output based systems for payments of ecosystem services applied in this study. Restriction 
and regulations from EU that would not allow for payments above the provision costs. It might 
also be politically infeasible with refunding system where farmers make (high) net gains. 
 
Appendix: Tables A1-A3 
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Table A1: Emission coefficients, tons of emission from consumption, tax rate and percentage price 
for all products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product Kg Co2eq 
emission/ 
kg consumption 
Tons of emission Climate tax Euro/t % increase in 
price 
Soft wheat 0.09 44.30 12.81 0.26 
Durum wheat 0.00 0.00 12.81 0.26 
Rye and meslin 0.08 9.52 11.96 0.25 
Barley 0.08 0.72 11.07 0.24 
Oats 0.09 3.30 13.00 0.29 
Grain maize 0.10 2.55 14.58 0.32 
Other cereals 0.11 20.36 14.88 0.32 
Pulses 0.06 0.92 8.51 0.15 
Potatoes 0.02 14.84 2.55 0.17 
Tomatoes 0.00 0.83 0.40 0.01 
Other vegetables 0.02 12.34 2.87 0.28 
Apples  pears and peaches 0.00 0.73 0.40 0.01 
Other fruits 0.02 4.25 3.49 0.18 
Beef 16.96 4665.30 2398.42 17.40 
Pork meat 2.54 973.75 359.21 3.73 
Sheep and goat meat 17.97 342.77 2542.55 17.17 
Poultry meat 1.28 311.01 181.38 3.49 
Eggs 0.84 115.33 118.54 1.93 
Butter 4.73 145.27 668.46 10.00 
Skimmed milk powder 3.79 136.26 535.41 11.83 
Cheese 5.85 1056.39 827.91 9.53 
Fresh milk products 1.10 1322.23 155.65 11.12 
Cream 4.75 758.22 671.51 9.92 
Concentrated milk 2.97 18.87 419.78 9.94 
Whole milk powder 5.04 243.67 712.45 11.57 
Casein 10.67 0.43 1508.96 12.63 
Whey powder 1.37 1.31 194.34 12.07 
Rape seed oil 0.42 16.94 58.89 1.01 
Sunflower seed oil 0.38 9.25 53.97 0.94 
Sugar 0.13 39.94 18.94 0.11 
Total  10250.69   
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Table A2: Registered areas and Actual payments for biodiversity on grassland, nutrient abatement 
by wetlands, and reductions in CO2e leaching from restoration of peatland. 
Region Biodiversity on grasslanda; 
Registered area    1000 SEK 
Nutrient abatement by 
wetlandb; 
Kg N/ha                     KgP/ha 
Peatland restoration, 
tonnes CO2e/hac ; 
Arable land   grassland 
Stockholm 9794 16431 150.50 2.95 25.9 11.1 
Östra mellansverige 89300 179232 150.50 2.95 25.9 11.1 
Sydsverige 70592 108225 365.50 3.92 25.9 11.1 
Norra mellansverige 14189 32968 47.00 0.63 25.9 11.1 
Mellersta Norrland 5019 16124 47.00 0.63 25.9 11.1 
Övre Norrland 4095 19415 18.50 0.53 25.9 11.1 
Småland med öarna 158265 282941 150.50 2.95 25.9 11.1 
Västsverige 69410 123656 343.50 2.73 25.9 11.1 
aSwedish Statistics (2017); b Gren et al. 2008; cSwedish Board of Agriculture (2014) 
 
Table A3 Agricultural revenue and income of Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) in each NUTS2 
region. For the Reference case in 2030. 
Region 
Revenue (Euro/ha or 
head) 
Income (Euro/ha or head) 
Total income (1000 
Euro) 
Stockholm 1661.10 242.32 29400.69 
Östra mellansverige 2586.60 344.48 241711.28 
Sydsverige 3623.33 457.92 280489.74 
Norra mellansverige 2612.23 524.61 113509.87 
Mellersta Norrland 2328.23 478.06 56645.33 
Övre Norrland 3308.99 774.37 77646.08 
Småland med Öarna 4907.54 867.11 325105.55 
Vätsverige 3073.22 368.61 255022.83 
Total   1379531.36 
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